April 13th 2009 was a dark day for Pakistan. After 18 months of violence in the Swat Valley, the Pakistani government approved a ceasefire agreement that ceded control of the district in the North West Frontier Province (NWFP) to Taliban militants and allowed them to impose Sharia (Islamic law). The inability of the army to control militancy in the region, an estimated thousand civilian deaths from army shelling and Taliban beheadings, and high-profile suicide attacks in Lahore and Islamabad have made both local people and politicians desperate for peace. However, if the government expected Taliban fighters to lay down their arms, they will be sorely disappointed: within hours of the legislation being passed, Taliban militants had raided the neighbouring district of Buner, giving them a foothold just 60 miles from Islamabad.
The US invasion of Afghanistan in 2001 should have spelled the end for the Taliban, a terrorist group that combined militant Islam with Pashtun tribal codes. However, a variety of factors have enabled Taliban resurgence both sides of the Afghanistan-Pakistan border. Firstly, Al Qaeda sponsored and trained not only Taliban fighters but also those engaged in jihad (holy war) in Kashmir. Keen for a constant supply of militants for this proxy war with India, Pakistan’s army and intelligence services (the ISI) provided refuge to Al Qaeda and Taliban officers fleeing Afghanistan. Rather than handing them over to the US for interrogation, militants were allowed to re-establish their training camps in Pakistan’s tribal areas. They were provided with weapons and finance, and shared intelligence with the ISI.
America’s failure to reconstruct Afghanistan after the invasion was also to blame in the Taliban’s revival. In 2001, expectations were high that US troops would stay in Afghanistan to help rebuild the country’s infrastructure and state institutions, in particular the police, army and judiciary. When this did not occur and Afghanistan fell instead to warlord control, disillusionment amongst ordinary people was rife. Caught between the warring warlord factions, their corruption and extortion on one side, and the Taliban on the other, many people began to support the Taliban in the belief that they could at least restore law and order. The Taliban was able to offer regular salaries to men in regions with no alternative employment and, in the absence of state-run schools, madrassas often provided the only source of education.
The influence of Taliban control in NWFP is inevitably felt most by people on the ground. In January 2009 alone, 400 girls’ schools were closed in the Swat Valley. Women have been banned from the markets and public places, music shops and barbers have been closed, and street floggings, one of the most abhorrent images of Taliban-era Afghanistan, have made their reappearance. Perhaps of most concern to the international community is that citizens no longer have the right of appeal to Pakistan’s supreme court; the religious police squads have, in many cases literally, become judge, jury and executioner.
Taliban resurgence in Pakistan also impacts on the stability of the region as a whole. Suicide attacks and the shift of power within Pakistan threatens the viability of the national government, showing it to be weak and ineffective. This apparent power vacuum offers extreme political parties the opportunity to gain legitimate power in Pakistan through elections. The security situation in Afghanistan cannot improve whilst militants train across the border and travel back and forth freely with the assistance of the ISI. Taliban camps are training militants not only for localised attacks but also for jihad in Kashmir, Uzbekistan and further afield. Suicide attacks in Bali, Madrid, London and Mumbai can all be linked back to groups training under the protection of Al Qaeda and the Taliban within Pakistan.
Perhaps the greatest threat of the Taliban’s rise in Pakistan is not, however, conventional suicide bombings but the possibility of nuclear attack. As early as 1998, bin Laden stated that the acquisition of nuclear weapons was “a religious duty”. He met with Abdul Qadeer Khan, the founder of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program, prior to 9/11, and in 2004 Khan was found guilty of selling nuclear plans to Libya, Iran and North Korea. The nuclear development programme in Pakistan may theoretically be controlled by the military, but they are either unable or unwilling to prevent the selling of information and technology to the highest bidder. The consequence of losing Pakistan to the Taliban, therefore, is of great concern to us all.
The solutions to Pakistan’s problems are far from straightforward; they will inevitably be expensive, complicated and take years to achieve measurable success. The first thing needed is substantial, ongoing investment. Whilst the economy fails in Afghanistan or Pakistan, the salaries offered by militant groups will continue to look attractive. Nothing beats poverty as a breeding ground for extremism, and those living in refugee camps along the border among the poorest on earth. Investment in infrastructure projects, especially road building, electricity and water supplies, demonstrates that foreign powers are taking a long-term interest in the region. The Taliban has no capacity or interest in community development, and so by investing in these areas alongside local governments, influence can be gained in the battle for hearts and minds.
Improved security is also essential for stability. Both during the 1990s and in this latest revival, the Taliban gained ground offering stability; in communities ravished by war, corruption and exploitation, this is a vital card to play. A greater presence of UN personnel on both sides of the border, providing Islamabad can be convinced to co-operate, would stem the flow of militants and raise local confidence. Troop presence musts go hand in hand with ongoing training of both Pakistan and Afghanistan’s armies and their police forces so that they build on their skills and are better able to protect their citizens from militancy.
Finally, the international community needs to simultaneously put pressure on, and offer support to, the Pakistani government to clamp down on extremism. Constructive dialogue with India must be sold as the only path for Kashmir, economic policy must focus on job creation, and the ISI must be brought under control of parliament so it is accountable. Lastly, Pakistan’s moderate parties need to be built up so that they can offer viable alternatives to the extremists at election time. Winning elections within a democratic system gives militants political legitimacy and enables them to use the institutions of state to further their radical goals. As long as we fail to encourage and support a capable, moderate opposition to give voters genuine choice in elections, we are all complicit in Pakistan’s truce with the Taliban.
Timeline
December 2001 US declares victory over Taliban in Afghanistan.
September 2007 Fighting begins in Swat Valley between Taliban militants and the Pakistani army
September 2008 Suicide bombing kills 54 at the Marriott hotel in Islamabad
December 2008 Swat Valley captured by the Taliban
January 2009 Taliban closes 400 schools for girls in the Swat Valley
March 2009 Militants attacks in Lahore and Islamabad
April 2009 Parliament approves ceding control of Swat Valley to Taliban; Taliban militants move into Buner.
This article originally appeared in the Taboo issue of Asian Geographic (www.asiangeo.com)
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