The Mughals at Home: Architecture and Imperial Ideology in the Indian Subcontinent

What links Bill Gates and the Indian ruler, Akbar the Great? Put simply, whilst the first is the leading mogul of today, the Mughal ruler Akbar, with his expansive, wealthy empire and monopoly on power, gave later moguls their name. The Mughal kings ruled an empire that stretched from Afghanistan to Bengal. They first came to power in the 16^th century and their golden age ended with the death of Emperor Aurangzeb in 1707. The Mughals’ familial lands were in Fergana (now in Kyrgyzstan) and so they had no direct claim to the empire they forged; their conquests in the Subcontinent began only after attempts to control Samarkhand had been thwarted.

The Mughal emperors held court in five cities: Kabul in Afghanistan, Lahore in Pakistan, and Delhi, Agra and Fatehpur Sikri in India. These cities’ buildings were designed to be physical manifestations of the Mughals’ power over landscape and subjects alike, deliberately espousing through their structures the Mughals’ imperial ideology. Genuine connoisseurship ran hand in hand with clever propaganda, reminding us of the Mughal emperors’ innovative techniques for drawing together under one crown  the diverse peoples of the Indian Subcontinent.

The Mughals were patrilineal descendants of the Central Asian ruler Amir Timur. They believed that their right to rule the subcontinent derived both from Timur’s 14^th century conquests and their own military gains. The Mughals’ Timurid heritage influenced their architectural style in a number of ways. Like their ancestors, the early Mughals were constantly on campaign so a peripatetic court was in order. Courtyards and walled gardens were favoured as tented cities could be erected within their confines. The entire imperial household moved en-masse around the country so that no part of the imperial structure was left vulnerable to seizure.  

The first Mughal emperor, Babur (r.1526-30), deplored India, describing it in the Baburnama as “charmless and disorderly”. Attempting to recreate his beloved gardens in Kabul, one of his first acts was to construct a walled garden in Agra. The garden gave Babur peace of mind as he was able to demonstrate his capacity to establish order in a seemingly wild and uncivilized land. Mughal gardens were designed to evoke the Garden of Paradise described in the Old Testament and in the Koran. Areas within the garden were divided by paved walkways, fruit trees provided shade and sustenance, and fountains were filled with water.

The Timurids’ other major contribution to Mughal architecture was invocations of the legendary King Solomon. In Delhi and Agra, the Mughals constructed multi-columned halls reminiscent of Solomon’s, and the image of Solomon’s throne, which the Bible describes as being multi-stepped and carved with numerous mechanical birds and beasts, was replicated by the Mughals. Emperors Jahangir (r.1605-27) and Shah Jahan (r.1628-58) constructed their own throne of Solomon, invoking his memory through emulation of his court so that subjects would equate Solomon’s just rule with that of their own Mughal monarch.

The majority of Mughal subjects were, unlike their rulers, non-Muslim and had little previous connection with the Timurids. In order to ensure the long term survival of their empire, the Mughals had to integrate the indigenous elite, show religious tolerance towards the wider populace, and to portray their right to rule as absolute. 

Akbar the Great (r.1556-1605) brought nobles and local rulers from across his empire to court and gave them posts within the administration. They included Persian nobles, Rajput princes, and other Muslim rulers with whom he wished to form alliances. Akbar created a strict hierarchy where everyone was ultimately answerable to him. He developed elaborate court rituals, necessitating the construction of separate audience halls for public and private affairs, a multitude of courtyards, and wide, straight streets for processions of elephants and horses. 

In Hindu kingdoms,  it was believed that devotees were blessed by the mere sight of religious idols and monarchs. The Mughals adopted darshan (‘viewing’) and appeared on ornate balconies before crowds gathered in the courtyard below. The position of the balcony was reminiscent of the qibla in a mosque, so the emperor was able to draw simultaneously on both Hindu and Muslim religious traditions in his self-deification. The scope of Akbar’s religious appeal widened further when he constructed the debating hall at Fatehpur Sikri. The building was designed as a multi-faith meeting place where all religious leaders could meet to discuss theological matters. Symbols representing each religion were incorporated into the hall’s stonework. Akbar believed himself to be an intermediary between men and God, and clear demonstration of his understanding of all different theological doctrines was integral to this.

The reputation of the Mughal court attracted influential visitors from across the globe. Travelers, traders, physicians and missionaries were entranced by the Mughals’ legendary wealth and brought with them knowledge and customs from Europe, Persia and China. Among the most important gifts from Europe was an illustrated copy of the 1569 Polyglot Bible and engravings of biblical scenes. They were presented to Akbar by Jesuit missionaries in an attempt to convert him to Christianity.

The Jesuits’ gifts engendered in the Mughals a taste for western art. Inspired by European works, Mughal artists began to incorporate images of Christ and Mary in their wall paintings, carvings and manuscripts. Symbols such as the halo, the lion and the lamb, the globe and the hour glass all made their way into Mughal design to show both the emperors’ religious legitimacy but also their temporal power. Use of Christian iconography demonstrated the emperors’ semi-divine status, their cosmopolitanism, and their ability to subordinate Christian Europe beneath their imperial power and personal religion.

Mughal capitals were reflected the change in priority from military conquest to the stable governance of a diverse population. Whilst early capitals required outdoor space for tents, later architects replaced these designs with permanent, highly decorative structures for courtly ceremonies. The Mughals’ Timurid heritage merged with indigenous traditions to deify the emperor in the minds of his subjects and to give him political and cultural legitimacy. Christian iconography was manipulated by Mughal artists, gaining political connotations that further enhanced state propaganda of the divine emperor and his inalienable right to rule. 

If you are interested in Mughal political ideology and art, please check out my E-book http://www.amazon.co.uk/Painting-Development-Portraiture-1526-1707-ebook/dp/B005CJLAOO/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&qid=1334337521&sr=8-1

"Engaging with Asia: The Challenges and Opportunities for the UK"

Tuesday night saw the launch event for FLAG (Future Leaders in Asia Group), the UK's first dedicated pan-Asian networking and leadership training forum. The event took place at the Cass Business School and the topic under discussion for the evening's four prestigious panelists and 60+ guests was "Engaging with Asia: The Challenges and Opportunities for the UK".

The four panelists were: 

 

Lord Desai, Professor Emeritus of the London School of Economics (LSE, former Director of LSE Global Governance and founding member of the LSE's Development Studies Institute (DESTIN)

Lord Flight, Chairman of Arden and Partners, former Shadow Chief Secretary to the Treasury and former Deputy Chairman of the Conservative Party

Sir David John KCMG, Chairman of BSI Group, co-founder of the Association of MBAs and former member of the CBI's International Advisory Board

Wan Zaidi Wan Abdullah, Deputy Malaysian High Commissioner and former Counsel General of Malaysia to Mumbai

Each of the panelists has extensive experience working in Asia, and they were able to draw upon observations from the fields of industry and finance, diplomacy and politics. Having initially spoken individually, the panelists then entered into combined discussion on the changing nature of the UK´s relationship with Asia, the responsibility of individuals as well as governments to actively seek engagement, and the differences between doing business with smaller Asian nations as opposed to BRIC countries.

Members of the audience then ploughed into the discussion with their own questions, drawing attention to controversial subjects such as the challenges presented to businesses by the UK's new bribery and corruption legislation. The panelists responded frankly and with good humour. 

Once out of the auditorium, the drinks flowed and discussion continued. The attendees, a mix of professionals, MBAs and masters students all with an active interest in Asia,  found plenty to talk about, so much so that a significant number moved on to All Bar One and then the late-opening B@1 on Bishop's Square.

For more information about FLAG or to sign up for future events, go to www.flagnetwork.org. 

Kyrgyzstan and Manas: Understanding the bigger picture

The Manas airbase has been an ongoing source of controversy since it first opened in 2001. Just 650 miles from Kabul, Manas may be ideally placed for supplying troops to Afghanistan but its presence was always going to rile Russia, who still sees Kyrgyzstan and her Central Asian neighbours as part of the motherland despite nearly 20 years of nominal independence. Calls in 2006 for the base to close were scotched when the US increased the value of its lease to $63m but this still falls far short of the $200m the Kyrgyz government requested. The disparity in amounts provided former Prime Minister Igor Chudinov with a useful, if not entirely believable, justification for yet another round of pressure on Manas.

The first question we have to ask is why does Kyrgyzstan matter? It is a mountainous, land-locked country with a population of just five million and, unlike its neighbours, it has negligible mineral resources. The economy is supported by contributions from Kyrgyz working abroad and foreign aid agencies, loans from the World Bank and IMF, and the income brought in by the US and Russian airbases. One thing, however, brings Kyrgyzstan to the attention of foreign powers: its geo-political position.

Three main groups have a concern in Kyrgyzstan: the Chinese, the Russians and the US. We’ll briefly look at the nature of, and reasons for, their interest in the country.  Kyrgyzstan borders China’s Xinjiang autonomous province, a region ruled from Beijing but populated by people who include Uighurs, Kazakhs, Tajiks and Kyrgyz. Xinjiang suffers ongoing tension and occasional violent outbreaks, such as the murder of 16 Chinese police officials by separatists in August 2008. Beijing policy is to increase the number of Han Chinese in the region in the hope that it will bring greater control and, as a result, stability. Financial incentives are offered to those moving to, and opening businesses in, Xinjiang and also over the border in Kyrgyzstan. The Chinese are actively purchasing Kyrgyz territory to expand their influence and, most importantly, to acquire alpine lakes and rivers that can be diverted to supply water to desert areas in Xinjiang. The most significant impact of this acquisition for Kyrgyzstan has been that a number of the country’s recently built hydroelectric power stations are not getting the water supplies they require; Bishkek’s power supply is insufficient to provide electricity around the clock.

Direct Russian influence in Kyrgyzstan has been felt since 1876 when the country became part of the Russian Empire. The country was established as a full republic of the USSR in 1936 and only formally declared independence from Moscow in August 1991. The Russians formerly trained all of their air force pilots in Kyrgyzstan and continue to keep an airbase in Bishkek; it’s just 20 miles from Manas. Large numbers of Kyrgyz are employed in Moscow and Russian companies dominate Kyrgyz industry; the Russian-managed Komtor gold mine single-handedly contributes 10% of Kyrgyzstan’s GDP.

Whilst Eastern Europe has fallen sway to the influence of the EU, Central Asia is still a region in which Russia can have an impact. The 2009/10 package of $2 billion in loans and $150 million in aid is as important for the area as a whole as it is for Kyrgyzstan. The loans are to be repaid over a five year period at a rate of 3% above Libor which, although not unfeasible for a developed country, is nigh on impossible when we consider that Kyrgyzstan’s GDP (nominal) in 2007 was just $3.748 billion. Put simply, the Russians are offering a loan they’re confident cannot be repaid. What is more, a large portion of the loan is earmarked for the construction of dams controlling water supply to Uzbekistan. Once the Kyrgyz default on their loan, the dam will come under Russian control. This will require the Uzbeks to play ball with Russia as long as they want continued irrigation for cotton, their greatest agricultural export.

The last of the three major players in Kyrgyzstan is, of course, the US. The Manas airbase is home to 1000 military personnel and serves as the primary hub for air operations in Afghanistan. With the withdrawal of troops from Iraq, the US has a single-point of military focus: Central Asia. Success in Afghanistan, and the prestige which would come from succeeding where the British and Russians have repeatedly failed, will depend on a reliable supply route for men, munitions and other goods. Whilst relations with Iran and Pakistan are a little less than rosy, Kyrgyzstan is the most convenient and stable of the alternatives.

The US also runs a 160-man embassy in Kyrgyzstan – a huge number of representatives considering the size of the population. Across Central Asia the US is running a hearts and minds campaign to counter-balance the influence of Russia, particularly when it comes to the control of gas and oil. While Gazprom has to date directed the supplies of Central Asian gas to Europe through its Caspian pipelines, the US is now backing the EU’s proposal to build the $10.19 billion Nabucco pipeline from Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan, through Turkey and the Balkans to Central Europe. Permission to build the pipeline, not to mention the ability to secure its supply, depends upon convincing local governments to support Europe’s interests over those of Russia. This is no mean feat.