Sunday, 31 July 2011

Kyrgyzstan and Manas: Understanding the bigger picture

The Manas airbase has been an ongoing source of controversy since it first opened in 2001. Just 650 miles from Kabul, Manas may be ideally placed for supplying troops to Afghanistan but its presence was always going to rile Russia, who still sees Kyrgyzstan and her Central Asian neighbours as part of the motherland despite nearly 20 years of nominal independence. Calls in 2006 for the base to close were scotched when the US increased the value of its lease to $63m but this still falls far short of the $200m the Kyrgyz government requested. The disparity in amounts provided former Prime Minister Igor Chudinov with a useful, if not entirely believable, justification for yet another round of pressure on Manas.

The first question we have to ask is why does Kyrgyzstan matter? It is a mountainous, land-locked country with a population of just five million and, unlike its neighbours, it has negligible mineral resources. The economy is supported by contributions from Kyrgyz working abroad and foreign aid agencies, loans from the World Bank and IMF, and the income brought in by the US and Russian airbases. One thing, however, brings Kyrgyzstan to the attention of foreign powers: its geo-political position.

Three main groups have a concern in Kyrgyzstan: the Chinese, the Russians and the US. We’ll briefly look at the nature of, and reasons for, their interest in the country.  Kyrgyzstan borders China’s Xinjiang autonomous province, a region ruled from Beijing but populated by people who include Uighurs, Kazakhs, Tajiks and Kyrgyz. Xinjiang suffers ongoing tension and occasional violent outbreaks, such as the murder of 16 Chinese police officials by separatists in August 2008. Beijing policy is to increase the number of Han Chinese in the region in the hope that it will bring greater control and, as a result, stability. Financial incentives are offered to those moving to, and opening businesses in, Xinjiang and also over the border in Kyrgyzstan. The Chinese are actively purchasing Kyrgyz territory to expand their influence and, most importantly, to acquire alpine lakes and rivers that can be diverted to supply water to desert areas in Xinjiang. The most significant impact of this acquisition for Kyrgyzstan has been that a number of the country’s recently built hydroelectric power stations are not getting the water supplies they require; Bishkek’s power supply is insufficient to provide electricity around the clock.

Direct Russian influence in Kyrgyzstan has been felt since 1876 when the country became part of the Russian Empire. The country was established as a full republic of the USSR in 1936 and only formally declared independence from Moscow in August 1991. The Russians formerly trained all of their air force pilots in Kyrgyzstan and continue to keep an airbase in Bishkek; it’s just 20 miles from Manas. Large numbers of Kyrgyz are employed in Moscow and Russian companies dominate Kyrgyz industry; the Russian-managed Komtor gold mine single-handedly contributes 10% of Kyrgyzstan’s GDP.

Whilst Eastern Europe has fallen sway to the influence of the EU, Central Asia is still a region in which Russia can have an impact. The 2009/10 package of $2 billion in loans and $150 million in aid is as important for the area as a whole as it is for Kyrgyzstan. The loans are to be repaid over a five year period at a rate of 3% above Libor which, although not unfeasible for a developed country, is nigh on impossible when we consider that Kyrgyzstan’s GDP (nominal) in 2007 was just $3.748 billion. Put simply, the Russians are offering a loan they’re confident cannot be repaid. What is more, a large portion of the loan is earmarked for the construction of dams controlling water supply to Uzbekistan. Once the Kyrgyz default on their loan, the dam will come under Russian control. This will require the Uzbeks to play ball with Russia as long as they want continued irrigation for cotton, their greatest agricultural export.

The last of the three major players in Kyrgyzstan is, of course, the US. The Manas airbase is home to 1000 military personnel and serves as the primary hub for air operations in Afghanistan. With the withdrawal of troops from Iraq, the US has a single-point of military focus: Central Asia. Success in Afghanistan, and the prestige which would come from succeeding where the British and Russians have repeatedly failed, will depend on a reliable supply route for men, munitions and other goods. Whilst relations with Iran and Pakistan are a little less than rosy, Kyrgyzstan is the most convenient and stable of the alternatives.

The US also runs a 160-man embassy in Kyrgyzstan – a huge number of representatives considering the size of the population. Across Central Asia the US is running a hearts and minds campaign to counter-balance the influence of Russia, particularly when it comes to the control of gas and oil. While Gazprom has to date directed the supplies of Central Asian gas to Europe through its Caspian pipelines, the US is now backing the EU’s proposal to build the $10.19 billion Nabucco pipeline from Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan, through Turkey and the Balkans to Central Europe. Permission to build the pipeline, not to mention the ability to secure its supply, depends upon convincing local governments to support Europe’s interests over those of Russia. This is no mean feat.

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